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Introduction			 Attempts	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 deep	 tensions	 and	 paradoxes	 that	inform	the	state	action	and	horizontal	effect	jurisprudence	are	largely	absent	in	the	 vast	 literature	 available	 today	 on	 this	 crucial	 subject.	 Attempts	 to	 come	 to	terms	with	the	conceptual	difficulties	 that	attach	to	 the	state	action	doctrine	 in	the	 United	 States	 remain	 stuck	 between	 acceptances	 and	 rejections	 of	 an	 idea	that	 one	 can,	 following	 Frank	 Michelman,	 call	 the	 “simple	 Hohfeldian	 point.”1	Michelman	 explains	 the	 simple	 Hohfeldian	 point	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 rather	unproblematic	 recognition	 that	 the	 state	 is	 ultimately	 the	 author	 of	 all	 law,	irrespective	of	whether	this	law	comes	in	the	form	of	legislation,	common	law	or	executive	 commands.2	 But	 this	 is	 Michelman’s	 short	 hand	 statement	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	point.	The	expanded	or	full	version	of	the	Hohfeldian	point	would	be	this:	The	state	is	ultimately	the	author	of	all	law,	irrespective	of	whether	this	law	comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 legislation,	 common	 law	 or	 executive	 commands	 or	 the	absence	 of	 legislation,	 common	 law	 or	 executive	 commands.	 This	 expanded	version	of	the	Hohfeldian	point	will	be	explained	in	Section	I	of	this	chapter.	The	 vicissitudes	 of	 the	 state	 action	 doctrine	 in	 the	 United	 States	 are	 a	function	of	 judicial	attitudes	that	either	embrace	or	reject	the	Hohfeldian	point.	That	this	is	so	will	be	shown	in	Section	II	of	this	chapter	with	reference	to	both	the	 shorthand	 and	 expanded	 version	 of	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point.	 Some	 American	judicial	 decisions	 accept	 that	 state	 authorship	 of	 law	 also	 includes,	 alongside	legislation,	authorship	of	common	law	and	authorship	of	judicial	decisions.	When	they	 do,	 they	 implicitly	 also	 accept	 that	 state	 authorship	 of	 law	 includes	 the	absence	of	 legislation	 and	 common	 law	 (absence	of	 judicial	 decisions	does	not	constitute	 a	 plausible	 variation).	 Some	 judicial	 decisions,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	steadfastly	deny	that	state	authorship	of	law	includes	authorship	of	common	law	rules	and	judicial	decisions.	Those	that	do	naturally	also	deny	that	authorship	of	law	includes	the	absence	of	legislation	and	common	law.	A	 dominant	 trend	 in	 the	 history	 of	 horizontal	 effect	 jurisprudence	 in	 a	number	of	significant	jurisdictions	outside	the	United	States	can	be	read	in	terms	of	 a	 consistent	 endeavour	 to	 prevent	 importation	 of	 those	 elements	 of	 the	American	 state	 action	 doctrine	 that	 represent	 a	 judicial	 endorsement	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	point.	That	 this	 is	 so	will	 be	 shown	with	 reference	 to	 the	Canadian	and	South	African	jurisdictions	in	Section	III	of	this	chapter.	Section	IV	will	also	highlight	 the	 irony	 evident	 in	 the	 South	 African	 resistance	 to	 the	 Hohfeldian	
                                                *	Thanks	to	André	van	der	Walt	for	reading	and	commenting	on	an	earlier	draft	of	this	chapter.	Shortcomings	are	of	course	strictly	my	own.	The	articulation	of	a	number	of	the	passages	in	this	chapter	rely	on	passages	 from	my	book	THE	HORIZONTAL	EFFECT	REVOLUTION	AND	THE	QUESTION	OF	SOVEREIGNTY	(2014).		1	 Frank	 I.	 Michelman,	 W(H)ither	 the	 Constitution?,	 21	 CARDOZO	 L.	 REV.	 1063,	 1076	 (2000)	[hereinafter	Michelman,	W(H)ither	the	Constitution?].	2	Frank	I.	Michelman,	The	Bill	of	Rights,	The	Common	Law,	and	the	Freedom-Friendly	State,	58	U.	MIAMI	L.	REV.	401,	404	(2003)	[hereinafter	Michelman,	The	Bill	of	Rights].	
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point.	 In	 its	 fervour	 to	 keep	 the	 boundaries	 of	 South	 African	 horizontal	 effect	Hohfeld-tight,	the	South	African	judiciary	did	not	only	rely	on	the	quarantine	to	which	the	Hohfeldian	point	was	subjected	in	Canada.	The	South	African	judiciary	also	 called	 in	 the	 service	 of	 German	 Drittwirkung	 jurisprudence,	 and	 more	specifically,	 the	 so-called	 indirect	 Drittwirkung	 approach	 articulated	 in	 the	famous	Lüth3	decision	of	the	German	Federal	Constitutional	Court	 in	1957.	The	irony	 of	 this	 reliance	 on	 Lüth	 consists	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 Lüth	 does	 not	 at	 all	represent	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point.	 It	 turns,	 in	 fact,	 on	 a	 clear	endorsement	 of	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point	 and	 its	 choice	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 indirect	approach	 to	 horizontal	 effect	 or	mittelbare	Drittwirkung	 does	 not	militate	 one	millimeter	 against	 its	 endorsement	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	 point.	 The	 South	 African	judiciary’s	reliance	on	Lüth	pivots	on	a	fundamental	misreading	of	Lüth.		Section	 IV	 subsequently	 turns	 to	 the	 reasons	 that	 inform	 the	 judicial	rejection	 of	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point.	 It	 explains	 the	 judicial	 rejection	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	 point	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 abdication	 of	 sovereignty.	 One	might	 respond	that	the	rejection	of	the	Hohfeldian	point	self-evidently	amounts	to	an	abdication	of	sovereignty.	Why	the	need	then	to	go	into	deeper	analyses	in	this	regard?	The	point	 of	 the	 deeper	 analyses	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	 point	 and	 abdications	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 state	 action	 or	 horizontal	effect	jurisprudence	is	to	highlight	the	deep	fault	line	that	has	been	destabilizing	this	 jurisprudence	 from	 its	 very	 beginnings.	 Should	 horizontal	 effect	jurisprudence	wish	to	rethink	itself	on	firmer	foundations,	it	would	first	need	to	come	to	terms	with	this	fault	line.			
I.	The	Hohfeldian	Point		 The	crux	of	the	Hohfeldian	point	is	this:	Law	does	not	only	consist	as	a	set	of	 relations	 between	 rights	 and	 duties.	 Law	 includes	 the	 correlative	 relations	between	the	binary	opposites	of	rights	and	duties.	The	legal	opposite	of	a	right	is	the	absence	of	a	right	or	a	non-right,	as	Hohfeld	calls	it.	The	opposite	of	a	duty	is	the	absence	of	a	duty.	Hohfeld	calls	the	absence	of	a	duty	a	 liberty.	When	one	is	not	under	a	duty	to	do	or	not	to	do	something,	one	is	at	liberty	to	do	or	not	to	do	that	thing;	one	has	the	liberty	to	do	or	not	do	it.	Liberties	relate	to	non-rights	in	the	 same	 way	 that	 duties	 relate	 to	 rights.	 And	 Hohfeld’s	 point	 is	 this:	 Law	consists	 as	 much	 in	 relations	 between	 non-rights	 and	 duties	 as	 it	 consists	 in	relations	 between	 rights	 and	 duties.	 In	 fact,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 legal	relationships	 actually	 consist	 in	 relations	 between	 non-rights	 and	 liberties.	Relations	between	rights	and	duties	materialize	relatively	rarely	 in	comparison	to	the	vast	spectrum	of	social	relations,	with	regard	to	which	there	are	no	legal	rules	that	assign	rights	or	duties	to	the	individuals	involved.	So	 how	 do	 relations	 between	 non-rights	 and	 liberties	 attain	 legal	significance?		They	do	so	when	litigation	ends	with	a	judicial	finding	that	the	law	provides	 no	 applicable	 remedy	 under	 the	 circumstances	 that	 overrides	 all	applicable	 defences.	 In	 other	 words,	 non-rights	 and	 liberties	 materialize	 in	 a	legally	 significant	 way	 when	 the	 claimant	 or	 plaintiff	 fails	 to	 make	 her	 case.	When	 this	 happens,	 the	 court	 basically	 tells	 the	 claimant	 that	 she	has	no	 right	
                                                3	 Bundesverfassungsgericht	 [BVerfG]	 [Federal	 Constitutional	 Court]	 Jan.	 15,	 1958,	 7	ENTSCHEIDUNGEN	DES	BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHTS	[BVERFGE]	198	(Ger.)	[hereinafter	Lüth].	
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(she	 has	 a	 non-right)	 to	 ask	 the	 defendant	 to	 do	 or	 not	 to	 do	 something.	 The	defendant	 has	 the	 liberty	 to	 do	 as	 he	 pleases	 as	 far	 as	 the	 complaint	 of	 the	plaintiff	 is	 concerned.	 The	 important	 point	 to	 note,	 however,	 is	 that	 this	relationship	between	a	plaintiff	 that	 has	no	 right	 and	 a	defendant	 that	 has	 the	liberty	to	act	freely	with	regard	to	the	complaint	filed	is	a	legal	relationship.	It	is	not	qualitatively	different	from	the	relations	that	materialize	when	a	court	finds	the	plaintiff	has	a	right	and	the	defendant	has	a	duty	to	act	 in	compliance	with	the	plaintiff’s	right.		Law	is	still	very	much	at	issue	in	the	relation	between	non-rights	and	liberties.	Law	is	not	absent	from	these	relations.	Law	just	appears	in	the	particular	but	pervasive	mode	of	its	presence	that	is	marked	by	the	absence	of	positive	rules	that	assign	rights	and	duties.4	What	is	the	point	of	discussing	the	Hohfeldian	point	yet	again,	one	might	well	ask.5	Not	only	 is	 it	 child’s	play	 to	make	 the	point,	as	Michelman	writes,6	 it	also	makes	 no	 real	 headway	 in	 any	 direction	 for	 there	 are	 evidently	 as	many	judges	 and	 lawyers	 that	 reject	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point	 as	 there	 are	 ones	 that	endorse	it.	This	much	will	become	clear	in	the	next	section	when	we	turn	to	state	action	case	law	in	the	United	States	and	horizontal	effect	 jurisprudence	outside	the	United	States	in	sections	III	and	IV.	In	other	words,	the	Hohfeldian	point	may	well	 be	 a	 clever	 and	 intellectually	 delightful	 ruse	 that	 appeals	 to	 those	 who	subscribe	to	an	expansive	understanding	of	constitutional	law	that	would	extend	constitutional	 protection	 of	 the	 vulnerable	 as	 far	 as	 conceivably	 possible.	 The	thinking	of	those	who	do	this	proceeds	as	follows:	All	law	is	in	principle	subject	to	constitutional	scrutiny.	 If	 law	is	also	present	 in	relations	between	non-rights	and	 liberties,	 it	 is	 present	 in	 the	 form	 of	 all	 conceivable	 social	 relationships,	which	means	 all	 social	 relationships	 are	 subject	 to	 constitutional	 scrutiny	 and	protection.	 But	 again,	 what	 is	 the	 point	 of	 continuing	 to	make	 the	 Hohfeldian	point	if	it	is	clear	by	now	that	some	lawyers	and	some	judges	simply	meet	it	with	flat	rejection?	The	 point	 of	 making	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point	 again	 in	 this	 essay	 is	 to	interpret	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	 point	 as	 an	 abdication	 of	 sovereignty	that	 frustrates—instead	 of	 advancing—the	 goal	 pursued	 by	 this	 deliberate	abdication.	 This	 is	 the	main	 point	 that	 this	 chapter	makes	 in	 Section	 V	 below.	Rejecting	 or	 endorsing	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point	 does	 not	 only	 concern	 a	 choice	between	 two	 conceptual	 stances,	 neither	 of	 which	 can	 claim	 exclusive	 and	conclusive	 validity,	 thus	 leaving	 the	 question	 regarding	 the	 reach	 of	 law	 and	constitutional	 law	undecided.	Rather,	 it	also	concerns	a	deeper	choice	between	two	 seemingly	 irreconcilable	 conceptions	 of	 statehood.	 The	 Hohfeldian	 point	articulates	a	strong	endorsement	of	the	principle	of	state	sovereignty.	It	takes	to	heart	the	principle	that	there	is	just	one	sovereign	that	authors	the	law.	It	takes	to	 heart	 the	 idea	 that	 any	 political	 power	 that	 claims	 sovereignty	 can	 only	 be	taken	 seriously	 if	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 effectively	 pursue	 the	 expression	 of	 its	political	 will	 in	 all	 walks	 of	 civil	 and	 social	 life.	 A	 sovereign	 does	 not	 leave	matters	to	contingent	or	chance	social	developments.	The	sovereign	responds	to	all	 such	 developments	with	 decisions	 to	make	 new	 law	 or	 decisions	 to	 refrain	
                                                4	Cf.	Wesley	Hohfeld,	Some	Fundamental	Legal	Conceptions	as	Applied	in	Legal	Reasoning,	23	YALE	L.J.	28	(1913).	See	also	Joseph	W.	Singer,	The	Legal	Rights	Debate	in	Analytical	Jurisprudence	from	
Bentham	to	Hohfeld,	1982	WIS.	L.	REV.	975,	for	his	instructive	discussion	of	Hohfeld’s	views.	5	Especially	if	one	has	done	it	so	many	times	before.	Cf.	references,	infra	note	47.	6	Frank	I.	Michelman,	W(H)ither	the	Constitution?,	supra	note	1,	at	1076	(2000).	
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from	making	 new	 law.	 Such	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 complete	 sovereignty.	 The	 idea	 is	surely	 not	 new.	 The	 Romans	 already	 knew	 and	 accepted	 the	maxim	 of	 tacitus	
consensu	populi.7	Hohfeld	did	not	apply	his	analysis	expressly	to	the	state	action	doctrine	or	horizontal	 effect	 jurisprudence,	 but	 many	 American	 scholars	 can	 be	 seen	 as	taking	 a	 Hohfeldian	 approach	 to	 the	 state	 action	 problematic.8	 Stephen	Gardbaum’s	 instructive	 contribution	 to	 the	 state	 action	 debate	 suggests	 the	whole	 state	 action	 doctrine	 can	 be	 recast	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 principle	 that	 the	Supremacy	Clause	of	the	United	States	Constitution	binds	all	judicial	action	in	the	United	 States,	 irrespective	 of	 state	 laws	 that	 may	 be	 at	 variance	 with	 the	Constitution.9	 Gardbaum’s	 is	 another	 typical	 Hohfeldian	 approach	 to	 the	 state	action	problem	which	 takes	all	 law—not	only	 legislation	but	 also	 common	 law	and	judicial	interpretations	of	common	law—as	state	action	that	is	subject	to	the	Constitution.	 Gardbaum	 does	 not	 address	 the	 point	 expressly,	 but	 one	 can	assume	 that	 his	 line	 of	 thinking	 also	 subsumes	 absence	 of	 legislation	 and	common	law	under	the	law	that	is	bound	by	the	United	States	Constitution.	But	these	scholarly	endorsements	of	the	Hohfeldian	point	constitute	but	one	camp	in	American	 jurisprudence.	 Another	 line	 of	 scholars	 and	 judges	 simply	 reject	 the	point.	They	do	not	do	so	because	they	do	not	grasp	its	logical	or	conceptual	force.	They	do	so,	we	shall	see	in	sections	II	and	III,	because	they	entertain	a	different	conception	of	the	state	that	resists	the	concept	of	full	state	sovereignty	and	the	idea	 that	 the	 state	 is	 the	 author	 of	 all	 positive	 law	 and	 all	 absences	 of	 such	positive	law.								
II.	Vicissitudes	of	the	American	State	Action	Doctrine			 The	 state	 action	 doctrine	 sprung	 its	 source	 in	 the	 following	 dictum	 of	Justice	Bradley	in	the	Civil	Rights	Cases:		 [C]ivil	 rights,	 such	 as	 are	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 Constitution	 against	 State	aggression,	 cannot	 be	 impaired	 by	 the	 wrongful	 acts	 of	 individuals,	unsupported	by	the	State	authority	in	the	shape	of	laws,	customs,	or	judicial	or	executive	proceedings.	The	wrongful	act	of	an	 individual	 .	 .	 .	 is	 simply	a	private	wrong,	or	a	 crime	of	 that	 individual.	 .	 .	 .	 [But	an]	 individual	 cannot	deprive	a	man	of	his	right	to	vote,	to	hold	property,	to	buy	and	sell,	to	sue	in	the	courts,	or	to	be	a	witness	or	a	juror;	he	may,	by	force	or	fraud,	interfere	with	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 right	 in	 a	 particular	 case;	 he	 may	 commit	 an	assault	against	the	person,	or	commit	murder,	or	use	ruffian	violence	at	the	polls,	or	slander	the	good	name	of	a	 fellow	citizen;	but,	unless	protected	in	these	wrongful	acts	by	some	shield	of	State	law	or	State	authority,	he	cannot	
                                                7	Cf.	HANS	KELSEN,	HAUPTPROBLEME	DER	STAATSRECHTSLEHRE	99–101	(1984)	(Ger.).	8	Cf.	JOHAN	VAN	DER	WALT,	THE	HORIZONTAL	EFFECT	REVOLUTION	AND	THE	QUESTION	OF	SOVEREIGNTY	171-72	n.10	(2014)	[hereinafter	VAN	DER	WALT,	HORIZONTAL	EFFECT	REVOLUTION],	 for	references	to	the	many	American	scholars	who	take	a	Hohfeldian	stance	in	their	state	action	jurisprudence.		9	U.S.	CONST.	art.	VI,	cl.	2.	The	Supremacy	Clause	reads:		This	 Constitution,	 and	 the	 Laws	 of	 the	 United	 States	 which	 shall	 be	 made	 in	Pursuance	 thereof;	 and	 all	 Treaties	 made,	 or	 which	 shall	 be	made,	 under	 the	Authority	of	 the	United	States,	 shall	 be	 the	 supreme	Law	of	 the	Land;	 and	 the	Judges	 in	every	State	 shall	be	bound	 thereby,	 any	Thing	 in	 the	Constitution	or	Laws	of	any	State	to	the	Contrary	notwithstanding.	
Id.;	 cf.	 Stephen	Gardbaum,	The	Horizontal	Effect	of	Constitutional	Rights,	 102	MICH.	 L.	 REV.	 387,	414–15	(2003).	
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destroy	or	injure	the	right;	he	will	only	hold	himself	amenable	to	satisfaction	or	punishment,	 and	amenable	 therefore	 to	 the	 laws	of	 the	State	where	 the	wrong	 acts	 are	 committed.	 Hence,	 .	 .	 .	 where	 the	 Constitution	 seeks	 to	protect	the	rights	of	the	citizen	against	discriminative	and	unjust	laws	of	the	State	by	prohibiting	such	 laws,	 it	 is	not	 individual	offences,	but	abrogation	and	 denial	 of	 rights,	 which	 it	 denounces	 and	 for	 which	 it	 clothes	 the	Congress	 with	 power	 to	 provide	 a	 remedy.	 This	 abrogation	 and	 denial	 of	rights	for	which	the	States	alone	were	or	could	be	responsible	was	the	great	.	 .	 .	 wrong	 which	 was	 intended	 to	 be	 remedied.	 And	 the	 remedy	 to	 be	provided	must	necessarily	be	predicated	upon	 that	wrong.	 It	must	assume	that,	 in	 the	 cases	 provided	 for,	 the	 evil	 or	wrong	 actually	 committed	 rests	upon	some	State	law	or	State	authority	for	its	excuse	and	perpetration.10		 The	key	assertion	of	this	dictum	turns	on	the	conceptual	construction	or	definition	of	individual	or	private	conduct	as	absolutely	incapable	of	curtailing	or	violating	 a	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 right.11	 A	 state	 can	 violate	 a	 constitutional	right	 but	 private	 individual	 conduct	 cannot.	 The	 construction	 derives	 from	 a	literal	 interpretation	 of	words	 contained	 in	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 of	 the	Constitution	which	stipulates	that:		
No	State	shall	make	or	enforce	any	law	which	shall	abridge	the	privileges	or	immunities	of	citizens	of	 the	United	States;	nor	shall	any	State	deprive	any	person	of	life,	liberty,	or	property	without	the	due	process	of	law;	nor	deny	to	any	person	within	its	jurisdiction	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.12			 At	 issue	 in	 this	 literal	 reading	of	 the	Fourteenth	Amendment	 is	not	only	the	 origin	 of	 the	 state	 action	 doctrine.	 Justice	 Bradley’s	 literal	 reading	 of	 the	Fourteenth	 Amendment	 also	 suggests	 that	 there	 are	 areas	 of	 law	 that	 do	 not	constitute	 state	action	 (state	 authorship),	 or	 it	 suggests	 that	 there	are	areas	of	social	 life	with	regard	to	which	the	state	has	hitherto	not	made	any	 law.	Either	some	law	is	not	state	action,	or	all	law	is	state	action	but	some	individual	conduct	is	completely	untouched	by	law.	Both	of	these	interpretations	of	Justice	Bradley’s	dictum	 came	 to	 mark	 a	 dominant	 line	 of	 thinking	 in	 American	 state	 action	adjudication	 and	 jurisprudence.	 But	 this	 line	 of	 thinking	 also	 came	 to	 be	challenged,	 if	 only	 intermittently,	 in	 later	 Supreme	 Court	 decisions.	 The	 first	significant	 challenges	 came	 from	 two	 decisions	 in	 the	 1940s:	 Labor	 v.	 Swing	(Swing),13	decided	in	1941,	and	Shelley	v.	Kraemer	(Shelley),14	decided	in	1948.		In	 Swing	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 decided	 that	 an	 Illinois	 common	 law	 rule	prohibiting	 secondary	 picketing	 (the	 picketing	 of	 any	 third	 party	 not	 directly	involved	 as	 an	 employer	 in	 a	 dispute	 between	 employers	 and	 employees)	constituted	an	unconstitutional	abridgment	of	the	freedom	of	expression	granted	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	decision	thus	clearly	accepted	the	principle	that	 common	 law	 rules	 constitute	 state	 action	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment.15	 This	 acceptance	 that	 common	 law	 rules	 constitute	 state	 action	
                                                10	109	U.S.	3,	17	(1883).	11	U.S.	CONST.	amend.	XIV.	12	Id.	§	1	(emphasis	added).	13	312	U.S.	321	(1941)	14	334	U.S.	1	(1948).	15	Swing,	312	U.S.	321.		
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would	 later	 find	 more	 illustrious	 endorsement	 in	 New	 York	 Times	 v.	 Sullivan	(Sullivan).16	Sullivan,	a	commissioner	of	the	City	of	Montgomery,	brought	a	civil	law	 libel	 action	 against	 four	 Alabama	 clergymen	 and	 the	 New	 York	 Times	Company	for	an	advertisement	run	in	the	New	York	Times	on	29	March	1960.17	The	 Circuit	 Court	 of	 the	 County	 of	 Montgomery	 awarded	 him	 damages	 to	 the	amount	of	$500,000	on	the	basis	of	the	common	law	of	Alabama.18	The	Supreme	Court	of	Alabama	upheld	the	judgment	on	appeal,	but	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	overturned	it	again	and	dismissed	the	claim	for	damages.	Justice	Brennan	found	the	Alabama	libel	law	on	which	the	claim	turned	to	fall	foul	of	the	First	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.19	The	respondent	claimed	that	his	action	for	damages	concerned	 a	 civil	 or	 private	 matter	 on	 which	 the	 Federal	 Constitution	 has	 no	bearing.	Justice	Brennan	responded	as	follows:			 We	may	dispose	at	 the	outset	of	 [the	 first	ground]	asserted	 to	 insulate	 the	judgment	 of	 the	 Alabama	 courts	 from	 constitutional	 scrutiny.	 [T]he	proposition	 relied	 on	 by	 the	 State	 Supreme	 Court	 that	 “The	 Fourteenth	Amendment	 is	directed	against	State	action	and	not	private	action”	 .	 .	 .	has	no	application	 to	 this	 case.	Although	 this	 is	a	 civil	 lawsuit	between	private	
                                                                                                                                       The	 scope	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 is	 not	 confined	 by	 the	 notion	 of	 a	particular	 state	 regarding	 the	 wise	 limits	 of	 an	 injunction	 in	 an	 industrial	dispute,	whether	 those	 limits	be	defined	by	 statute	or	by	 the	 judicial	 organ	of	the	 state.	 A	 state	 cannot	 exclude	 workingmen	 from	 peacefully	 exercising	 the	right	 of	 free	 communication	 by	 drawing	 the	 circle	 of	 economic	 competition	between	 employers	 and	workers	 so	 small	 as	 to	 contain	only	 an	 employer	 and	those	directly	employed	by	him.		
Id.	 at	325–26;	 Justice	Frankfurter’s	 reference	 in	 this	dictum	 to	a	 “judicial	organ	of	 state”	might	point	to	the	possibility	that	his	decision	is	actually	much	closer	to	the	one	in	Shelley	334	U.S.	1,	cf.	
infra	 note	 21.	 However,	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 whole	 case	 suggests	 that	 it	 was	 the	 existence	 of	 a	common	law	rule	and	not	just	the	judicial	application	of	the	rule	that	decided	the	matter	for	him.		16	376	U.S.	254	(1963).	17	 The	 advertisement	 in	 the	New	 York	 Times	 on	 which	 the	 claim	 was	 based,	 did	 not	 mention	Sullivan	by	name,	but	referred	to	“loads	of	police	armed	with	shotguns	and	tear-gas”	that	ringed	the	Alabama	State	College	Campus	in	order	to	suppress	civil	rights	protests	on	the	campus.	The	advertisement	also	stated,	among	more	allegations,	that	“the	Southern	violators	have	answered	Dr.	[Martin	Luther]	King’s	peaceful	protests	with	intimidation	and	violence”,	“have	arrested	him	seven	 times	 for	 ‘speeding’,	 ‘loitering’	 and	 similar	 ‘offenses’	 [and	 have	 now]	 charged	 him	with	perjury”.	 Sullivan	 claimed	 that	 the	 article	 implicated	 the	 police,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 ringing	 of	 the	campus	where	 they	were	expressly	mentioned,	but	also	 in	all	of	 the	 latter	actions,	and	by	 thus	implicating	the	police,	also	implicated	him	as	commissioner	of	Montgomery.		18	 In	 the	 trial	 court	 judgment,	 the	 judge	 instructed	 the	 jury	 that	 the	 statements	 in	 the	advertisement	 were	 ‘libellous	 per	 se’	 and	 ‘not	 privileged’.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 common	 law	 of	Alabama,	 he	 instructed	 further,	 injury	 is	 implied	 by	 the	 bare	 fact	 of	 the	 per	 se	 libellous	publication.	Malice,	falsity	and	general	damages	are	presumed	and	need	not	be	alleged	or	proved,	and	punitive	damages	may	be	awarded	by	the	jury	if	they	found	that	the	statements	were	indeed	published	 maliciously	 and	 not	 just	 negligently	 or	 carelessly.	 The	 liability	 of	 the	 defendants	therefore	ultimately	only	turned	on	the	questions	whether	the	jury	found	the	article	to	have	been	published	 by	 the	 defendants	 and	 whether	 the	 statements	 were	 made	 ‘of	 and	 concerning’	 the	plaintiff.	The	judge	rejected	the	defendants’	contention	that	his	rulings	abridged	the	freedoms	of	speech	and	of	the	press	guaranteed	by	the	First	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.	19	The	decision	turned	on	the	finding	that	common	law	rules	that	 imposed	the	burden	to	prove	truth	 and	 absence	 of	 malice	 on	 the	 defendants	 in	 a	 libel	 claim	 cannot	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	robust	freedom	of	expression	granted	by	the	First	and	Fourteenth	Amendment	when	criticism	of	public	officials	and	personalities	is	at	stake.	The	constitutional	standard,	Justice	Brennan	decided,	requires	that	the	claimant	carry	the	burden	of	proof	of	falsity	and	malice.	Cf.	Sullivan	376	U.S.	at	297–98.		
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parties,	 the	 Alabama	 courts	 have	 applied	 a	 state	 rule	 of	 law	 which	petitioners	 claim	 to	 impose	 invalid	 restrictions	 on	 their	 constitutional	freedoms	of	speech	and	press.	It	matters	not	that	that	law	has	been	applied	in	 a	 civil	 action	 and	 that	 it	 is	 common	 law	 only,	 though	 supplemented	 by	statute.	The	test	is	not	the	form	in	which	state	power	has	been	applied	but,	whatever	the	form,	whether	such	power	has,	in	fact,	been	exercised.20		
Sullivan	basically	put	state	action	“out	of	business”,	claims	Michelman.	 If	the	 Constitution	 tolerates,	 neither	 executive	 state	 administration,	 nor	 state	legislation,	nor	state	common	law	that	falls	foul	of	its	guarantees,	there	is	simply	no	basis	left	on	which	a	constitutionally-unsound	contention	can	enter	a	court	of	law	and	exit	that	court	triumphantly.		State	action	had	 in	 fact	been	“put	out	of	business”	 twice	before	Sullivan.	The	first	time	in	1941	by	Justice	Frankfurter	in	Swing,	as	shown	above,	and	the	second	 time	 in	 1948	 in	 the	 even	more	 dramatic	 judgment	 of	 Justice	 Vinson	 in	
Shelley.21	 The	 disputes	 in	 Shelley	 turned	 on	 the	 question	 whether	 the	 court	enforcement	 of	 two	 restrictive	 covenants	 entered	 into	 by	 private	 individuals	constituted	 state	 action	 that	was	 subject	 to	 review	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment	of	the	United	States	Constitution.	At	 issue	were	the	appeals	of	two	Negro	 families	 against	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Courts	 of	 Missouri	 and	Michigan	 that	 restrictive	 covenants	between	private	 individuals	 in	 the	 cities	of	St.	Louis	and	Detroit	that	prevented	Negroes	from	occupying	properties	subject	to	 the	 covenants	 did	 not	 abridge	 rights	 protected	 by	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment.22	 The	 respondents	 in	 both	 cases	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 no	 state	action	involved	in	the	covenants	and	that	the	mere	enforcement	of	the	covenants	by	 a	 court	 of	 law	 also	 does	 not	 constitute	 state	 action	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	Fourteenth	 Amendment.	 The	 Federal	 Supreme	 Court	 dismissed	 this	 argument.	Justice	Vinson’s	opinion	for	the	Court	put	the	matter	in	no	uncertain	terms:			
                                                20	Id.	at	265.	See	Michelman,	The	Bill	of	Rights,	supra	note	2,	at	403	(for	a	similar	quotation	of	this	passage).	21	334	U.S.	1	(1948).	22	The	first	case	concerned	the	enforcement	of	a	restrictive	covenant	between	owners	of	property	on	a	section	of	Labadie	Avenue	in	the	city	of	St.	Louis	that	they	will	not	allow	their	property	to	be	occupied	 by	 people	 of	 the	 “Negro	 or	Mongolian	 Race”	 for	 a	 period	 of	 50	 years.	 Pursuant	 to	 a	contract	of	sale	of	one	of	the	properties	subject	to	the	restrictive	covenant,	the	Shelleys,	a	“Negro”	couple,	received	the	title	or	deed	for	the	property	purchased	from	the	seller	 in	August	1945.	In	October	1945,	other	owners	of	property	subject	to	the	covenant	sought	to	obtain	an	order	from	the	Circuit	Court	of	St.	Louis	to	prevent	the	Shelleys	from	occupying	the	purchased	property.	The	Circuit	Court	refused	to	grant	the	order.	The	court	found	that	the	agreement	had	never	become	effective,	given	the	 failure	of	 the	participants	 in	the	covenant	to	obtain	the	signatures	of	all	 the	property	 owners	 in	 the	 district	 as	 the	 covenant	 stipulated.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Missouri	overturned	the	Circuit	Court’s	decision	by	finding	that	the	covenant	had	become	effective.	By	the	time	it	did	so,	however,	the	Shelleys	had	already	moved	into	the	house	they	purchased.	They	now	petitioned	 the	Federal	 Supreme	Court	 to	obtain	an	order	 that	 the	 restrictive	 covenant	violated	the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment.	 The	 second	 case	 concerned	 an	 essentially	 similar	 set	 of	 facts	regarding	 property	 purchased	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Detroit.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 Circuit	 Court	 of	 Wayne	Country	 granted	 an	 order	 that	 the	 purchasers,	 one	 Ferguson	 and	 his	 wife,	 must	 vacate	 the	property	within	90	days.	They	 appealed	 to	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	Michigan	on	 the	 ground	 that	they	had	been	denied	 the	 rights	protected	by	 the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	 Supreme	Court	dismissed	the	appeal	on	the	finding	that	no	Fourteenth	Amendment	rights	had	been	affected	by	any	of	the	afore-going	events.	
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That	the	action	of	state	courts	and	judicial	officers	in	their	official	capacities	is	to	be	regarded	as	action	of	the	State	within	the	meaning	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	 is	a	proposition	which	has	 long	been	established	by	decisions	of	 this	 Court.	 That	 principle	 was	 given	 expression	 in	 the	 earliest	 cases	involving	the	construction	of	the	terms	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.23		 Justice	 Vinson’s	 opinion	 proceeded	 to	 trace	 the	 acceptance	 that	adjudication	 constitutes	 state	 action	 through	 a	 long	 history	 of	 Supreme	 Court	case	 law.	 The	 earliest	 cases	 to	 which	 the	 court	 was	 referring	 here	 included	
Virginia	v.	Rives24	and	Ex	Parte	Virginia25,	both	of	which	were	decided	in	1880,	as	well	 as	 the	Civil	Rights	Cases	 of	 1883.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 latter,	 Justice	Vinson	observed	the	following:		 In	the	Civil	Rights	Cases	this	Court	pointed	out	that	the	Amendment	makes	void	 “state	 action	 of	 every	 kind”	which	 is	 inconsistent	with	 the	 guaranties	therein	 contained,	 and	 extends	 to	manifestations	of	 “State	 authority	 in	 the	shape	 of	 laws,	 customs,	 or	 judicial	 or	 executive	 proceedings.”	 Language	 to	like	effect	is	employed	no	less	than	eighteen	times	during	the	course	of	that	opinion.26		 Justice	 Vinson	 could	 in	 fact	 also	 have	 gone	 back	 all	 the	 way	 to	 Chief-Justice	 Marshall’s	 emphatic	 statement	 that	 courts	 are	 also	 bound	 by	 written	constitutions	 in	 Marbury	 v.	 Madison.27	 The	 consistent	 acceptance	 of	 the	Hohfeldian	 point	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 jurisprudence	 appears	 incontestable.	Yet,	 avers	 Michelman,	 “something	 persists	 in	 [American]	 jurisprudence	 that	walks	and	talks	like	a	state	action	doctrine	with	teeth.”28	Why	is	this	so?	Justice	Vinson	was	 the	 first	 to	back	off	 from	his	 own	opinion	 in	Shelley.	Five	years	after	his	explosive	judgment	in	Shelley,	Justice	Vinson	would	argue	in	
Barrows	v.	Jackson	(Barrows)29	that	the	principle	in	Shelley	only	applies	when	the	court’s	 order	 will	 be	 the	 direct	 cause	 of	 the	 abridgement	 of	 an	 individual’s	constitutional	rights	by	enforcing	a	racially	discriminatory	covenant	against	the	member	of	 the	 racial	minority	 targeted	by	 that	 covenant.	 It	 does	not	 apply,	 he	argued,	when	the	court	only	stands	to	enforce	the	covenant	between	the	parties	to	the	covenant.	An	action	for	damages	filed	by	one	party	to	the	covenant	against	another	is	therefore	not	covered	by	the	rule	in	Shelley.	Chief	Justice	Vinson’s	opinion	in	Barrows	did	not	convince	the	majority	of	the	court	and	for	this	reason	had	no	immediate	effect.	But	the	reasoning	that	he	employed	 surely	 opened	 the	 door	 for	 or	 anticipated	 the	 majority	 decision	 in	
                                                23	Shelley,	334	U.S.	at	14.	It	is	obvious	that	Shelley	could	have	been	decided	on	the	same	principle	that	 common	 law	 rules	 constitute	 state	 action	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 protection	 afforded	 by	 the	Fourteenth	 Amendment.	 Henry	 Friendly	 suggests	 it	 was	 decided	 thus,	 but	 Frank	 Michelman	contends	more	convincingly	that	it	was	not.	Cf.	Henry	J.	Friendly,	The	Public-Private	Penumbra—
Fourteen	Years	Later,	 130	U.	 PA.	 L.	 REV.	 1289,	 1295	 (1982),	with	Michelman,	The	Bill	 of	 Rights,	
supra	note	2,	at	406.		24	100	U.S.	313	(1880).	25	100	U.S.	339	(1880).	26	Cf.	Shelley,	334	U.S.	at	14-15	(1948).	27	 5	 U.S.	 137	 (1803)	 (“confirms	 and	 strengthens	 the	 principle,	 supposed	 to	 be	 essential	 to	 all	written	constitutions,	that	a	law	repugnant	to	the	constitution	is	void;	and	that	all	courts,	as	well	as	other	departments,	are	bound	by	that	instrument.”).	Id.	at	180	(emphasis	Justice	Marshall,	C.J.).	28	Michelman,	The	Bill	of	Rights,	supra	note	2,	at	404.	29	346	U.S.	249	(1953).	
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Black	v.	Cutter	Laboratories	(Cutter	Laboratories)30	 in	which	the	Supreme	Court	enforced	 a	 collective	 bargaining	 agreement	 that	 held	 Communist	 Party	membership	 as	 a	 just	 cause	 for	 dismissal.	 The	majority	 held	 that	 the	 decision	turned	on	nothing	but	 the	 interpretation	of	 a	 contract	between	private	parties	and	 thus	 rendered	 constitutional	 principles	 irrelevant.31	 Chief-Justice	 Warren	and	Justices	Douglas	and	Black	tried	in	vain	to	uphold	the	rule	in	Shelley.32	Justice	 Vinson’s	 turn	 in	Barrows	 and	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	
Cutter	Laboratories	could	not	have	pivoted	on	a	 failure	to	grasp	the	Hohfeldian	point.	 It	 turned	 on	willful	 decisions	 to	 reject	 it	 and	 to	 ignore	 a	 long	 history	 of	Supreme	Court	decisions	 in	which	 it	was	 incontestably	accepted,	a	history	 that	Justice	Vinson	himself	traced	in	detail	in	Shelley.	The	Supreme	Court’s	decision	to	ignore	Hohfeld	is	articulated	in	the	clearest	of	terms	in	Chief	Justice	Rehnquist’s	opinion	 in	 Flagg	 Brothers,	 Inc.	 v.	 Brooks.33	 As	 Michelman	 puts	 it,	 Justice	Rehnquist	simply	“insisted	 .	 .	 .	 that	American	constitutional-legal	doctrine	must	pretend	 not	 to	 notice	 it”.34	 According	 to	 Chief	 Justice	 Rehnquist	 “[i]t	 would	intolerably	 broaden	 .	 .	 .	 the	 notion	 of	 state	 action	 under	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment	to	hold	that	the	mere	existence	of	a	body	of	property	law	in	a	State,	whether	decisional	or	statutory,	itself	amounted	to	‘state	action’”.35	The	most	 remarkable	 aspect	 of	 Chief	 Justice	 Rehnquist’s	 articulation	 of	the	matter	 is	 the	way	 it	 even	 excludes	 statutory	 private	 law	 from	 the	 scope	of	state	 action.	 This	 exclusion	 of	 statutory	 private	 law	 from	 state	 action	 either	implies	 that	a	significant	percentage	of	 the	sovereign’s	 legislation	 is	simply	not	subject	 to	 constitutional	 scrutiny,	 or	 it	 implies	 that	 a	 significant	 percentage	 of	American	 legislation	 is	 not	 authored	 by	 the	 sovereign.	 It	 either	 implies	 a	considerable	suspension	of	basic	principles	of	constitutionalism	and	the	rule	of	law,	or	it	implies	a	considerable	denial	of	sovereignty.			 What	happens	when	one	admits	 to	vast	 enclaves	of	human	co-existence	within	state	boundaries	 that	 simply	 fall	outside	 the	 reach	of	 state	 sovereignty?	One	 turns	 the	 state	 into	 an	 archipelago	 of	 sovereign	 islands	 within	 a	 vast	wilderness	 of	 lawlessness.	 One	 draws	 the	 Blood	 Meridian	 just	 outside	 one’s	doorstep.36	 In	 fact,	 one	 fails	 to	 draw	 the	 Blood	 Meridian,	 for	 the	 wilderness	ultimately	does	not	 respect	 doorsteps.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 one	 is	 likely	 to	 find	 its	darkest	 caves	 inside	 doorsteps,	 as	 the	 case	 of	 DeShaney	 v.	Winnebago	 County	
Department	 of	 Social	 Services	 makes	 abundantly	 clear	 (DeShaney).37	 DeShaney	surely	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 American	 people’s	 darkest	 disavowals	 of	sovereignty.	 Officials	 of	 the	 Winnebago	 County	 Department	 Social	 Services	Department	knew	what	was	going	on	 in	 the	house	where	 the	DeShaneys	 lived.	They	knew	or	should	have	known	in	view	of	the	evidence	available	to	them	that	Randy	DeShaney	was	maiming	his	son	 Joshua	DeShaney	 for	 life.	They	stood	by	and	 did	 nothing	 until	 it	 was	 too	 late.	 Instead	 of	 admitting	 to	 a	 failure	 of	sovereignty,	 a	 failure	 of	 state	 sovereignty	 that	 dismally	 failed	 the	 Fourteenth	
                                                30	351	U.S.	292	(1956).	31	Id.	at	299.	32	Id.	at	300,	302.	33	436	U.S.	149	(1978).	34	Michelman,	W(H)ither	the	Constitution?,	supra	note	1,	at	1076.	35	Flagg	Brothers,	436	U.S.	at	160	n.10.	36	CORMAC	MCCARTHY,	THE	BLOOD	MERIDIAN	(1990).	37	489	U.S.	189	(1989).	
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Amendment	of	the	Federal	Constitution,	the	Supreme	Court	preferred	to	read	the	
DeShaney	 case	 in	 terms	of	 a	 disavowal	 of	 sovereignty.	 Joshua	DeShaney	would	have	 been	 entitled	 to	 tort	 compensation	 from	 the	 state	 had	 the	 people	 of	Wisconsin	 passed	 legislation	 that	 provided	 for	 tort	 action	 in	 response	 to	 the	state’s	 failure	 to	 act.	 But	 Wisconsin	 had	 not	 passed	 such	 legislation,	 averred	Justice	Rehnquist,	and	that	is	the	end	of	the	story.38	Thus	 did	 Justice	 Rehnquist	 erase	 the	Blood	Meridian.	 Thus	 did	 he	 turn	America	into	the	American	frontier.	Thus	did	he	ensure	that	America	would	be,	at	least	as	far	as	its	legal	consciousness	is	concerned,39	no	country	for	the	old,	the	young,	or	for	anyone.40		
III.	 Vicissitudes	 of	 Horizontal	 Effect	 in	 Canadian,	 South	 African	 and	 German	
Jurisprudence		 The	United	States	Supreme	Court	stabilized	the	borders	of	the	American	Republic	with	its	decisions	in	Swing,	Shelley	and	Sullivan.	These	decisions	defined	a	 territory	 in	which	American	 law	and	 the	American	Constitution	 governed,	 at	least	 in	 principle,	 in	 no	 uncertain	 terms.	 This,	 however,	 was	 not	 how	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	would	see	the	matter	when	it	laid	down	its	horizontal-application	jurisprudence	in	RWDSU	v.	Dolphin	Delivery	Ltd	(Dolphin	Delivery),41	taking	 the	 exact	 opposite	 position	 to	 the	 one	 taken	 by	 Justice	 Frankfurter	 in	
Swing.42		
Dolphin	 Delivery	 also	 turned	 on	 the	 question	 whether	 an	 injunction	against	 secondary	picketing	obtained	under	Canadian	 common	 law	constituted	an	unconstitutional	abridgment	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	guaranteed	
                                                38	Id.	 The	people	of	Wisconsin	may	well	prefer	a	system	of	liability	which	would	place	upon	the	State	and	 its	officials	 the	responsibility	 for	 failure	 to	act	 in	situations	such	as	 the	present	one.	They	may	create	such	a	system,	 if	 they	do	not	have	 it	already,	 by	 changing	 the	 tort	 law	 of	 the	 State	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 regular	lawmaking	process.	But	they	should	not	have	it	thrust	upon	them	by	this	Court's	expansion	of	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.		
Id.	at	202–03.	39	One	need	not	mention	its	infamous	laws	on	the	possession	of	firearms.	40	Cf.	Cormac	McCarthy,	No	Country	for	Old	Men	(2005).	One	can	also	say	this	 is	the	country	 in	which	Senator	Rance	Stoddard	gets	shot	instead	of	Liberty	Valance.	Cf.	John	Ford,	THE	MAN	WHO	SHOT	LIBERTY	VALANCE	(Paramount	Pictures	1962).		41	[1986]	2	S.C.R.	573	(Can.).	42	Labor	v.	Swing,	312	U.S.	321	(1941).	
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by	section	2(b)	of	 the	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms.43	Section	1	of	the	Charter	makes	provision	for	reasonable	limitations	of	the	Charter	rights.	The	respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 common	 law	 rule	 constituted	 such	 a	 reasonable	limitation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression	 granted	 by	 section	 2(b).	 The	appellant	argued	 that	 the	 limitation	was	not	reasonable.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	 finally	 dismissed	 the	 injunction	 of	 secondary	 picketing	 granted	 by	 the	trial	 court.	The	Court	not	only	did	so	on	 the	ground	 that	 the	common	 law	rule	against	 secondary	 picketing	 constituted	 a	 reasonable	 limitation	 of	 the	 right	 to	freedom	of	expression,	but	also	on	the	ground	that	the	Charter	did	not	apply	to	common	law	disputes	in	which	the	state	was	not	a	party.	It	 is	the	latter	ground	that	is	of	concern	in	what	follows.	Justice	McIntyre	delivered	the	judgment	for	the	majority	of	the	court.	His	finding	 that	 the	 Charter	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 common	 law	 disputes	 in	which	 the	state	is	not	a	party	turned	on	a	peculiar	limitation	of	the	reasoning	in	Swing	and	
Sullivan	and	an	 implied	but	 fervent	rejection	of	 the	reasoning	 in	Shelley.	 Justice	McIntyre’s	 judgment	 commenced	with	 a	 firm	 recognition	 that	 section	 52(1)	 of	the	Charter	nullifies	all	law	that	is	inconsistent	with	the	provisions	contained	in	the	 Charter.44	 This	 recognition	 is	 fully	 consistent	with	 the	 recognition	 that	 the	common	 law	 constitutes	 state	 action	 in	 Swing	 and	 Sullivan,	 but	 it	 did	 not	 last	long.	Justice	McIntyre	almost	immediately	proceeded	to	retreat	from	this	broad	acceptance	 that	 all	 common	 law	 is	 bound	 by	 the	 Constitution	 by	 asserting,	 in	view	of	sections	32(a)	and	32(b)	of	the	Charter,	that	the	Constitution	only	binds	common	law	that	applies	to	governmental	action.	This	is	how	he	put	it:			 In	 this	way	 the	Charter	will	 apply	 to	 the	 common	 law,	whether	 in	 public	 or	private	 litigation.	 It	will	apply	 to	 the	common	law,	however,	only	 in	so	 far	as	the	common	law	is	the	basis	of	some	governmental	action	which,	it	is	alleged,	infringes	 a	 guaranteed	 right	 or	 freedom.	 .	 .	 .	 The	 element	 of	 governmental	intervention	necessary	to	make	the	Charter	applicable	in	an	otherwise	private	
                                                43	 Id.	The	appellant,	 a	workers	union	 (Retail,	Wholesale	and	Department	Store	Union)	acted	as	bargaining	 agent	 for	 the	 locked	 out	 employees	 of	 Purolater,	 an	 Ontario	 based	 courier.	 The	respondent	 made	 local	 deliveries	 for	 Purolater	 in	 its	 area,	 at	 first	 directly	 and	 later	 through	Supercourier,	a	company	connected	to	Purolater.	Appellant	had	approached	the	British	Columbia	Labour	Relations	Board	 for	 a	 declaration	 that	 the	Respondent	 and	 Supercourier	were	 allies	 of	Purolator.	The	declaration	would	have	enabled	the	appellant	to	lawfully	picket	the	respondent’s	business	 premises.	 The	 Board	 declined	 to	 hear	 the	 application	 for	 want	 of	 jurisdiction.	 The	lawfulness	of	the	picketing	now	had	to	be	determined	on	the	basis	of	the	Canadian	common	law,	given	the	silence	of	the	Canada	Labour	Code,	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	L-2	on	the	matter.	Under	the	common	law,	the	matter	turned	on	the	rule	that	secondary	picketing	(the	picketing	of	any	third	party	not	directly	involved	as	an	employer	in	a	dispute	between	employers	and	employees)	was	unlawful.	The	 respondent	had	obtained	 an	 injunction	quia	 timet	 on	 the	basis	 of	 this	 rule	 and	 the	 appeal	against	 the	 granting	 of	 the	 injunction	 now	 turned	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 rule	 constituted	 an	unconstitutional	infringement	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	guaranteed	by	section	2(b)	of	the	 Canadian	 Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	 Freedoms,	 Part	 1	 of	 the	 Constitution	 Act,	 1982,	 being	Schedule	B	to	the	Canada	Act,	1982,	c.	11	(U.K.).	44	Dolphin	Delivery,	[1986]	2	S.C.R.,	supra	note	41.	The	English	text	provides	that	“any	law	that	is	inconsistent	with	the	provisions	of	the	Constitution	is,	to	the	extent	of	the	inconsistency,	of	no	force	or	effect.”	If	this	language	is	not	broad	enough	to	include	the	common	law,	it	should	be	observed	as	well	that	the	French	text	adds	strong	support	to	this	conclusion	in	its	employment	of	the	words	“elle	rend	inopérantes	les	dispositions	incompatibles	de	tout	autre	règle	
de	droit.”		
Id.	at	para.	25	(emphasis	added).	
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action	is	difficult	to	define.	We	have	concluded	that	the	Charter	applies	to	the	common	law	but	not	between	private	parties.45		 Cast	 in	 terms	 of	 Swing	 and	 Sullivan,	 Justice	McIntyre’s	move	 essentially	amounts	to	saying	this:	The	fact	that	the	common	law	constitutes	state	action	is	not	enough	for	the	Constitution	to	apply;	further	state	action	is	required	for	the	Constitution	to	apply.	Dolphin	can	in	other	words	be	argued	to	have	formulated	a	
double	state	action	test	for	constitutional	application	in	Canada.	Justice	McIntyre	found	it	necessary	to	make	sure	that	Shelley	did	not	find	a	way	into	Canada.	He	did	not	refer	to	Shelley,	only	to	the	“troublesome”	view	of	Professor	Hogg.	Hogg	wrote	in	the	second	edition	of	his	Constitutional	Law	of	Canada:		 The	fact	that	a	court	order	is	governmental	action	means	that	the	Charter	will	apply	 to	 a	 purely	 private	 arrangement,	 such	 as	 a	 contract	 or	 proprietary	interest,	 but	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 Charter	 will	 preclude	 judicial	enforcement	 of	 any	 arrangement	 in	 derogation	 of	 a	 guaranteed	 right.	 In	 a	sense,	the	common	law	authorizes	any	private	action	that	is	not	prohibited	by	a	positive	 rule	 of	 law.	 If	 the	 Charter	 applied	 to	 the	 common	 law	 in	 that	attenuated	 sense,	 it	 would	 apply	 to	 all	 private	 activity.	 But	 it	 seems	 more	reasonable	 to	 say	 that	 the	 common	 law	 offends	 the	 Charter	 only	 when	 it	crystallizes	 into	 a	 rule	 that	 can	 be	 enforced	 by	 the	 courts.	 Then,	 if	 an	enforcement	 order	 would	 infringe	 a	 Charter	 right,	 the	 Charter	 will	 apply	 to	preclude	the	order,	and,	by	necessary	implication,	to	modify	the	common	law	rule.46		
                                                45	Id.	at	paras.	34-35.	46	Id.	para.	35,	quoting	PETER	W.	HOGG,	CONSTITUTIONAL	LAW	OF	CANADA	VOL.	II	678	(5th	ed.	2007).	
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Again,	Justice	McIntyre	found	this	view	“troublesome.”	As	he	put	it:		 I	find	the	position	thus	adopted	troublesome	.	.	.	[I]t	should	not	be	accepted	as	an	 approach	 to	 this	 problem	 .	 .	 .	 To	 regard	 a	 court	 order	 as	 an	 element	 of	governmental	 intervention	necessary	 to	 invoke	 the	Charter	would	 .	 .	 .	widen	the	scope	of	Charter	application	to	virtually	all	private	litigation.	All	cases	must	end,	 if	 carried	 to	 completion,	 with	 an	 enforcement	 order	 and	 if	 the	 Charter	precludes	the	making	of	the	order,	where	a	Charter	right	would	be	infringed,	it	would	 seem	 that	 all	 private	 litigation	would	be	 subject	 to	 the	Charter.	 [T]his	approach	will	 not	 provide	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 question.	 A	more	 direct	 and	 a	more	precisely-defined	connection	between	the	element	of	government	action	and	the	claim	advanced	must	be	present	before	the	Charter	applies.47		 As	Hogg	clearly	notes	in	his	response	to	the	decision	in	Dolphin	Delivery,	Justice	 McIntyre	 was	 exorcising	 the	 specter	 of	 Shelley	 in	 this	 passage.	 Having	invented	this	doubly	fortified	state	action	jurisprudence—state	action	in	the	form	
of	 common	 law	 is	 really	 only	 state	 action	 when	 corroborated	 by	 further	 state	
action,	 and	 state	action	 in	 the	 form	of	 law	 is	only	 state	action	when	 the	 further	
state	action	required	to	make	it	state	action	is	not	judicial	action—the	decision	in	
Dolphin	that	the	Charter	does	not	apply	to	the	dispute	in	the	case	could	not	have	come	 as	 a	 surprise.	 And	 thus	 the	 endless	 American	 frontier—the	 great	 Wild	West—swept	into	the	vast	Canadian	prairielands.		And	 then	 it	 crossed	 the	Atlantic	 and	 swept	 south,	 far	 south.	 One	would	have	 thought	 that	 the	 freshly	 liberated	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa,	 with	 its	liberation	movement	government	and	a	team	of	constitutional	judges	as	faithful	to	the	new	democratic	Constitution	as	one	might	wish	for,	would	opt	 forcefully	and	unequivocally	for	a	constitutional	jurisprudence	that	would	consolidate	and	strengthen	 the	 civil	 sovereignty	 for	which	 so	many	had	 fought	 so	hard	and	 for	which	so	many	had	come	undone.	The	invocation	of	Eliot	is	deliberate	here.	One	would	have	thought	that	no	chances	would	be	taken	with	the	survival	and	return	of	the	wastelands	of	the	past.	But	this	was	not	to	be.	In	its	landmark	judgment	on	the	 horizontal	 effect	 of	 the	 constitutional	 rights	 contained	 in	 chapter	 3	 of	 the	Constitution	 of	 South	 Africa	 of	 1993,	 Du	 Plessis	 v.	 De	 Klerk	 (Du	 Plessis),48	 the	South	African	Constitutional	Court	took	the	clearest	stance	imaginable	in	favor	of	
Dolphin	 Delivery	 and	 against	 Shelley	 and,	 by	 obvious	 implication,	 also	 against	
Swing	and	Sullivan.	And	as	if	Dolphin’s	doubly	fortified	state	action	jurisprudence	was	 not	 sufficient	 for	 purposes	 of	 keeping	 Shelley,	 Swing	 and	 Sullivan	 out,	 the	South	African	Constitutional	Court	would	further	invoke	a	serious	misreading	of	the	significantly	sovereignty-friendly	and	Shelley-friendly	jurisprudence	that	the	Federal	German	Constitutional	Court	articulated	in	its	now	famous	Lüth	decision	in	1958.	But	this	was	not	all	that	was	remarkable	about	the	Du	Plessis	case.	As	if	determined	to	pile	irony	upon	irony,	the	judge	who	most	vociferously	announced	the	constitutional	sovereignty	of	the	fledgling	republic,	Justice	Kriegler,	was	also	the	one	who	most	vociferously	disavowed	this	sovereignty.49	
                                                47	Dolphin	Delivery,	[1986]	2	S.C.R.	573,	para.	36.	48	1996	(5)	BCLR	658	(CC)	(S.	Afr.).	49	See	VAN	DER	WALT,	HORIZONTAL	EFFECT	REVOLUTION,	supra	note	8,	at	(2014)	90–92,	117–19,	160,	311–12,	for	an	extensive	engagement	with	Justice	Kriegler’s	“dissenting”	opinion	in	Du	Plessis.	
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Space	constraints	preclude	detailed	engagement	with	the	remarkable	Du	
Plessis	 judgment	and	its	most	remarkable	dissenting	and	concurrent	opinions.50	Suffice	it	to	note	the	clear	endorsement	of	the	insistence	in	Dolphin	Delivery	that	constitutional	 rights	 only	 apply	 to	 common	 law	 disputes	 when	 the	 state	 is	directly	involved	in	the	dispute	and	not	only	as	author	of	applicable	common	law	rules.51	 And	 suffice	 it	 to	 note	 its	 clear	 rejection	 of	 Shelley.	 That	 judges	 act	 on	behalf	of	or	as	the	state	is	a	fact	that	none	of	the	judges	sitting	in	the	Du	Plessis	case	would	deny	in	the	abstract,	but	those	who	concurred	in	the	majority	opinion	all	endorsed	the	Dolphin	Delivery	rejection	of	Shelley:	However	obvious	it	may	be	that	regular	judicial	action	constitutes	the	third	branch	of	sovereign	government,	it	simply	does	not	count	as	state	action	for	purposes	of	activating	constitutional	scrutiny.	 To	 state	 the	matter	 properly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 key	 clause	 of	 the	 1993	Constitution	on	which	the	decision	was	based,	the	judiciary	was	not	included	in	Article	 7(1)	which	 defined	 the	 scope	 of	 state	 action	 to	which	 the	 Constitution	applies.	Article	7(1),	the	majority	opinion	in	Du	Plessis	asserted,	was	devised	in	this	way	exactly	for	purposes	of	negating	the	rule	in	Shelley.52	Probably	 sensing	 and	 addressing	 the	 significant	 loss	 of	 sovereignty	evident	in	this	reading	of	Article	7(1),	the	South	African	Constitutional	Assembly	revised	 the	 application	 provisions	 in	 Article	 7(1)	 of	 the	 Interim	 Constitution	incisively	when	 they	drafted	Article	8(1)	of	 the	1996	Constitution.	Article	8(1)	now	expressly	listed	the	judiciary	among	the	organs	of	state	that	are	subject	to	constitutional	 scrutiny.53	 And	 the	 Constitutional	 Assembly	 went	 even	 further.	Almost	as	if	to	make	double	sure	that	the	forfeiture	of	sovereignty	performed	in	
Du	 Plessis	 would	 not	 happen	 again,	 it	 stipulated	 in	 Article	 8(2)	 that	 the	Constitution	 also	 binds	 private	 individuals	 when	 appropriate.54	 The	Constitutional	 Court,	 however,	 persisted	 with	 the	 application	 jurisprudence	developed	in	Du	Plessis	when	it	commenced	to	apply	the	1996	Constitution.	It	did	so	by	constructing	an	intricate	semantic	relation	between	sections	8(1),	8(2)	and	8(3)	 to	which	we	shall	 return	below.	Suffice	 it	 to	 say	 that	 it	persisted	with	 the	abdication	of	sovereignty	performed	in	Du	Plessis	until	 it	 finally,	by	implication,	re-appropriated	 this	 forfeited	 sovereignty	 some	years	 later	with	 its	decision	 in	the	 case	 of	 Carmichele	 v.	 Minister	 of	 Safety	 and	 Security	 and	 Another	(Carmichele).55	In	 the	 end,	 the	 majority	 judgment	 in	Du	 Plessis	 opted	 for	 the	 so-called	indirect	 horizontal	 effect	 or	mittelbare	Drittwirkung	 method	 developed	 in	 the	
Lüth	judgment.	The	indirect	method	of	constitutional	application	has	become	an	
                                                50	I	have	discussed	the	Du	Plessis	case	and	South	African	horizontal	effect	jurisprudence	in	several	other	 articles.	 See	 van	 der	 Walt,	 Progressive	 Indirect	 Horizontal	 Effect	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights:	
Towards	a	Co-operative	Relation	Between	Common–Law	and	Constitutional	 Jurisprudence,	 17	 S.	AFR.	 J.	 HUM.	 RTS.	 341	 (2001);	 van	 der	 Walt,	 Horizontal	 Effect	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights	 and	 the	
Threshold	of	the	Law	in	View	of	the	Carmichele	Saga,	19	S.	AFR.	J.	HUM.	RTS.	517	(2003).		51	Cf.	Du	Plessis,	1996	(5)	BCLR,	supra	note	48,	at	para.	49b.	52	S.	AFR.	CONST.,	1996.	Article	7(1)	states:	“This	chapter	[containing	the	Bill	of	Rights]	shall	bind	all	legislative	and	executive	organs	of	state	at	all	levels	of	government.”	Id.	53	 Id.	 art.	8(1),	which	reads:	 “The	Bill	of	Rights	applies	 to	all	 law,	and	binds	 the	 legislature,	 the	executive,	the	judiciary	and	all	organs	of	state.”	54	Id.	art.	8(2),	which	reads:	“A	provision	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	binds	a	natural	or	a	juristic	person	if,	and	to	the	extent	that,	it	is	applicable,	taking	into	account	the	nature	of	the	right	and	the	nature	of	any	duty	imposed	by	the	right.”	55	Carmichele	v.	Minister	of	Safety	and	Security	and	Another	2001	(4)	SA	938	(CC)	(S.	Afr.).										
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essential	 ingredient	 of	 contemporary	 legal	 consciousness.56	 It	 turns	 on	 the	principle	that	constitutional	protections	do	not	apply	to	private	disputes	directly.	Litigants	 can	 accordingly	 not	 rely	 on	 constitutional	 rights	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	private	disputes;	 they	must	 rely	 on	private	 law	 remedies.	 Constitutional	 rights	nevertheless	 remain	 relevant	 to	 private	 law	 litigation	 because	 the	 judicial	application	 of	 private	 law	must	 remain	 reconcilable	with	 constitutional	 values	and	ideally	promote	these	values.	Thus	do	constitutional	values	radiate	through	the	 private	 law	 system,	 as	 the	 German	 Constitutional	 Court	 put	 the	matter	 in	
Lüth.57						The	 method	 applied	 as	 articulated	 in	 Lüth	 is	 problematic	 in	 many	respects,	as	has	been	pointed	out	especially	well	in	German	scholarship	over	the	years.	Suffice	it	to	state	briefly	only	the	most	problematic	aspect	of	the	indirect	method:	 It	 rarely	 remains	 a	 matter	 of	 pure	 method.	 It	 invariably	 addresses	questions	of	constitutional	substance	 (questions	as	 to	whether	 the	Constitution	applies	or	not)	as	mere	questions	of	form	(questions	as	to	how	the	Constitution	must	be	applied).	The	Lüth	decision	made	it	abundantly	clear	that	the	judiciary	is	one	 of	 the	 organs	 of	 state	 sovereignty.	 It	 is	 therefore	 as	 much	 conditioned	(burdened	 would	 be	 too	 weak	 an	 expression)	 by	 the	 constitutional	 duty	 to	protect	 the	 constitutional	 rights	 of	 citizens	 as	 the	 executive	 and	 legislative	powers	of	the	state	are.58	The	Lüth	judgment	also	corroborated	its	unambiguous	avowal	of	 state	and	 judicial	 sovereignty—and	 its	unflinchingly	positive	answer	to	 the	 whether	 question—with	 a	 remarkable	 concluding	 passage	 that	 would	become	nothing	less	than	a	formulaic	maxim	that	it	would	employ	consistently	in	future	adjudication.	The	conclusion	in	Lüth	reads	as	follows:		 The	 decision	 of	 the	 Regional	 Court	 failed	 to	 recognise	 the	significance	which	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression	 enjoys	 also	 in	 those	cases	where	it	comes	into	conflict	with	private	interests.	As	such	it	fell	short	of	 constitutional	 criteria	 and	 must	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 violated	 the	fundamental	right	which	the	plaintiff	enjoys	in	terms	of	article	5	I.59					 A	 clearer	 restatement	 of	 the	 rule	 in	 Shelley	 cannot	 be	 imagined:	 “The	decision	 of	 the	 Regional	 Court	 .	 .	 .	 must	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 violated	 the	fundamental	 right	 [of]	 the	 plaintiff.”	 Again,	 the	 German	 Federal	 Constitutional	Court	went	on	to	use	this	 formula	repeatedly	 in	 future	decisions.60	Considering	its	misgivings	vis-à-vis	Shelley,	 the	South	African	Constitutional	Court	had	good	
                                                56	Compare,	for	example,	the	essays	in	Human	Rights	in	Private	Law	(Daniel	Friedman	&	Daphne	Barak-Erez	eds.,	2001).	57	Lüth,	supra	note	3,	at	205–06.	58	Id.	at	206–07.	59	Id.	at	230:	 Das	Bundesverfassungsgericht	ist	auf	Grund	dieser	Erwägungen	zu	der	Überzeugung	 gelangt,	 daß	 das	 Landgericht	 bei	 seiner	 Beurteilung	 des	Verhaltens	des	Beschwerdeführers	die	besondere	Bedeutung	verkannt	hat,	die	dem	 Grundrecht	 auf	 freie	 Meinungsäußerung	 auch	 dort	 zukommt,	 wo	 es	 mit	privaten	Interessen	anderer	in	Konflikt	tritt.	Das	Urteil	des	Landgerichts	beruht	auf	diesem	Verfehlen	grundrechtlicher	Maßstäbe	und	verletzt	so	das	Grundrecht	
des	Beschwerdeführers	aus	Art	5	Abs	1	Satz	1	GG.	(Emphasis	added).	60	See	24	BVerfG	278;	25	BVerfG	256;	30	BVerfG	173;	34	BVerfG	35	BVerfG	202;	42	BVerfG	142;	46	BVerfG	325;	54	BVerfG	129;	54	BVerfG	148;	60	BVerfG	234;	61	BVerfG	1;	62	BVerfG	230;	66	BVerfG	116;	73	BVerfG	261	(Ger.).	
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reason	 to	 be	much	more	 apprehensive	 of	 the	 jurisprudence	 laid	 down	 in	Lüth	than	it	was.	But	it	was	enamored	with	the	indirect	method	in	Lüth	and	proceeded	to	sever	this	method	from	the	clear	avowals	of	judicial	state	sovereignty	and	the	clear	endorsements	of	Shelley	that	are	written	all	over	Lüth.	It	basically	ignored	these	avowals	of	sovereignty	and	endorsements	of	Shelley	in	Lüth.	That	is	how	it	managed	 to	 turn	 the	 question	 of	 method	 into	 a	 question	 of	 sovereignty.	 No	longer	founded	and	anchored	by	the	clear	substantive	avowal	of	sovereignty	 in	
Lüth,	 the	 indirect	 method	 itself	 commenced	 to	 stand	 in	 for	 the	 sovereignty	question	in	Du	Plessis.	The	indirect	method	became	a	device	for	determining	the	question	 whether—and	 not	 just	 how—the	 Constitution	 applied	 to	 a	 private	dispute.		The	 debate	 between	 proponents	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 horizontal	 effect	was	 fuelled	 from	 its	 very	 beginnings	 by	 the	 contentious	 way	 the	 indirect	approach	 bypassed	 and	 absorbed	 the	 question	 of	 sovereignty.	 Or,	 to	 be	 more	precise,	it	was	fuelled	by	the	perception	that	the	indirect	approach	bypassed	the	question	 of	 sovereignty	 by	 absorbing	 it.	 Had	 the	 indirect	 approach	 from	 the	beginning	 been	 an	 “innocent”	 matter	 of	 method;	 had	 it	 from	 the	 beginning	recognized	that	the	Constitution	applies	self-evidently	to	all	possible	instances	of	social	conflict	and	discontent	because	the	state	self-evidently	takes	responsibility	for	all	such	conflict	and	discontent;	and	had	it	further	only	added	to	this	that	it	is	probably	better	 first	to	cast	discontent	between	private	 individuals	 in	standard	terms	of	private	law	before	one	starts	scrutinizing	the	impact	of	the	Constitution	on	 that	 discontent,	 the	 debate	 between	 proponents	 of	 the	 direct	 and	 indirect	approach	to	horizontal	effect	would	have	been	much	less	charged	and	probably	rather	 short-lived.	 But	 proponents	 of	 the	 direct	 approach	 sensed	 that	 the	proponents	of	the	indirect	approach	were	up	to	something	more.	And	they	were	right.	It	was	clear	from	Günter	Dürig’s	first	contributions	to	the	debate	that	the	whole	brouhaha	about	method	was	 informed	by	one	 thing	 and	one	 thing	only,	namely,	 the	 endeavor	 to	 reserve	 an	 a	 priori	 sphere	 of	 private	 freedom	 that	 is	untouched	or	“less	touched”	by	the	sovereignty	of	the	Constitution.61	At	issue	in	the	 indirect	 approach	 is	 a	 surreptitious	 resistance	 to	 sovereignty	 among	 some	legal	 theorists	 and	 a	 surreptitious	 inclination	 among	 some	 judges	 to	 forfeit	sovereignty.	Constitutional	 clauses	undoubtedly	do	not	affect	private	 individuals	and	public	 officials	 in	 exactly	 the	 same	 way.	 This	 difference	 between	 the	Constitution’s	impact	on	private	individuals	and	public	officials	is	indeed	one	of	the	 key	 questions	 that	 the	 how	 question,	 the	 question	 of	 method,	 should	 be	addressing.	 But	 the	 whether	 question	 became	 a	 vehicle	 for	 evading	 the	 how	question.	Simplistic	and	surreptitious	whether	questions	should	not	stand	in	for	complex	 how	 questions.	 Surreptitious	 replacements	 of	 how	 questions	 with	
whether	 questions	 either	 amount	 to	 outright	 abdications	 of	 sovereignty	 or	obfuscated	 avowals	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 fail	 to	 take	 sovereign	 responsibility	 as	constitutional	democratic	sovereigns	would:	Openly,	honestly	and	transparently.	They	 amount	 to	 abdications	 of	 sovereignty	when	 the	 surreptitious	 response	 is	negative	 (i.e.,	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 private	 sphere).	 They	amount	 to	 obfuscations	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 failures	 to	 own	 up	 to	 sovereignty	
                                                61	 Günter	 Dürig,	 Grundrechte	 und	 Zivilrechtsprechung,	 in	 VOM	 BONNER	 GRUNDGESETZ	 ZUR	GESAMTDEUTSCHEN	 VERFASSUNG.	 FESTSCHRIFT	 ZUM	 75.	 GEBURTSTAG	 VON	 HANS	 NAWIASKY	 177–82	(Theodor	Maunz	ed.,	1956)	(Ger.).	
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when	the	surreptitious	response	 is	positive	(i.e.,	 the	Constitution	does	apply	 to	the	private	sphere,	but	only	by	influencing	private	law	in	some	way	or	another).	It	is	a	good	question	which	of	these	two	responses	one	should	dread	most.	The	 replacement	 of	how	with	whether	 questions	 and	 the	 obfuscation	 of	sovereignty	concomitant	to	it	continued	to	dominate	South	African	constitutional	jurisprudence	 after	 Du	 Plessis,	 as	 the	 judgment	 in	 Khumalo	 v.	 Holomisa	(Khumalo)62	makes	abundantly	clear.	In	the	hope	of	moving	the	court	to	turn	the	defendant’s	 burden	 of	 disproving	 negligence	 in	 defamation	 claims	 against	 the	press	 (the	 current	 position	 in	 South	 Africa63)	 into	 the	 claimant’s	 burden	 of	proving	malicious	intent	(the	position	in	Sullivan),	the	defendants	requested	the	court	to	apply	the	constitutional	protection	of	freedom	of	speech	directly	to	the	case	as	Article	8(2)	requires	and	not	in	terms	of	the	development	of	the	common	law	 that	 Article	 8(3)	 requires.	 Dismissing	 this	 request,	 Justice	 O’	 Regan	surreptitiously	disavowed	 the	direct	application	of	 the	Constitution	 to	 the	case	that	she	herself	had	just	affirmed	in	a	previous	paragraph	of	her	judgment.64	She	effectively	 performed	 this	 disavowal	 by	 claiming	 that	 Article	 8(3)	 would	 be	rendered	 meaningless	 if	 Article	 8(2)	 were	 taken	 to	 allow	 direct	 resort	 to	constitutional	rights	in	private	law	disputes.	Some	 might	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 wrong	 with	 and	 nothing	disavowing	 about	 this	 argument.	 However,	 the	 argument	 turns	 on	 a	 crucial	misreading	and	it	 is	 this	misreading	that	allows	for	the	disavowal	of	horizontal	effect	and	of	sovereignty	at	issue	here.	Article	8(3)	would	indeed	be	rendered	pro	
non-scripto	 if	 Article	 8(2)	 suggested	 constitutional	 rights	 could	 be	 invoked	directly	 in	 private	 litigation.	 But	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 Article	 8(2)	 that	 suggests	this.	 It	 only	 stipulates	 that	 the	 rights	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 apply	 to	 private	 legal	subjects	 and	 says	 nothing	 about	 how	 this	 application	 must	 be	 pleaded	 by	litigants	or	articulated	by	courts.	Article	8(3)—which	can	indeed	be	construed	as	dealing	 with	 (and	 only	 with)	 the	 question	 of	 how	 horizontal	 effect	 must	 be	pleaded	 and	 articulated	 by	 litigants	 and	 courts—can	 therefore	 not	 affect	 the	direct	horizontal	 effect	 stipulated	 in	Article	8(2).	 It	 only	 called	 for	 a	method.	 It	only	called	for	the	undeniable	direct	application	called	for	under	Article	8(2)	to	be	processed	via	the	regular	discourse	of	private	law.	This,	however,	 is	not	quite	how	Justice	O’	Regan	approached	the	matter.	She	proceeded	as	 if	 the	 requirement	 to	process	 the	 claim	and	defence	 through	private	 law	 affected	 the	 substantive	 question	 regarding	 the	 constitutionally	required	 burden	 of	 proof	 significantly.	 A	 clear	 avowal	 of	 the	 direct	 horizontal	effect	 stipulated	 in	 Article	 8(2)	 and	 a	 clear	 avowal	 of	 the	 unambiguous	affirmation	 of	 constitutional	 sovereignty	 thus	 contained	 in	 8(2)	 would	 have	made	 it	 abundantly	 clear	 to	 the	 defendants	 that	 Article	 8(2)	 affords	 them	 no	advantage	that	Article	8(3)	takes	away	from	them.	It	would	have	made	clear	that	Article	8(2)	does	not	offer	a	stronger	defence	than	Article	8(3)	offers.	But	Justice	O’	Regan	did	not	do	this.	She	preferred	to	leave	the	spurious	impression	hanging	that	the	method	of	application	prescribed	in	Article	8(3)	restricts	the	substance	of	 application	 prescribed	 by	 Article	 8(2);	 that	 is,	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	common	 law	 in	 accordance	 with	 Article	 8(3)	 offers	 some	 shelter	 against	 the	sovereign	reach	of	the	Constitution	that	Article	8(2)	does	not	provide.		
                                                62	Khumalo	v.	Holomisa	2002	(5)	SA	401	(CC)	(S.	Afr.).	63	National	Media	v.	Bogoshi	1998	(4)	SA	1196	(SCA)	(S.	Afr.).	64	Khumalo	v.	Holomisa	2002	(5)	SA	401	(CC)	at	para.	30–32	(S.	Afr.).	
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That	this	shelter	does	not	exist	was	later	conceded	by	the	Constitutional	Court’s	judgment	in	Carmichele	v.	Minister	of	Safety	and	Security.	The	concession	came	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 recognition	 that	 Articles	 8(3)	 and	 39(2)	 require	constitutional	scrutiny	of	all	private	law	causes	of	action.	Carmichele	is	the	South	African	equivalent	of	Swing	 and	Sullivan.	The	decision	 in	Carmichele	 effectively	recognized	 that	 any	 private	 law	 cause	 of	 action	 that	 provided	 insufficient	protection	 of	 constitutional	 rights	 undoubtedly	 falls	 foul	 of	 those	 rights.	 This	means	 that	 it	 ultimately	 cannot	 make	 any	 difference	 whether	 one	 processes	litigation	in	the	language	of	private	law	or	constitutional	law.	The	decision	in	Carmichele	effectively	confirms	the	substantive	reality	of	direct	 horizontal	 effect.	 It	 effectively	 confirms	 the	 reality	 that	 an	 option	 to	process	 litigation	 either	 in	 terms	 of	 Article	 8(2)	 or	 8(3),	 had	 it	 existed,	 could	never	have	had	any	 impact	on	 the	substantive	outcome	of	 the	 litigation,	as	 the	defendants	claimed	in	Khumalo.	By	failing	to	tell	them	so	clearly,	Justice	O’Regan	avoided	 the	 express	 avowal	 of	 the	 sovereign	 reach	 of	 the	 South	 African	Constitution	 embodied	 in	 Articles	 8(1)	 and	 8(2).	 This	 avowal	 of	 constitutional	sovereignty	 can	 now	 be	 distilled	 from	 close	 readings	 of	 the	 Carmichele	decision,65	 but	 the	 South	 African	 judiciary	 has	 still	 not	 developed	 clear	jurisprudence	on	this	point.	This	is	remarkable	when	one	considers	the	actuality	that	 the	 question	 of	 horizontal	 effect	 has	 enjoyed	 for	 such	 a	 long	 time.	 The	horizontal	effect	question	enjoyed	constant	attention	 in	South	Africa	ever	since	the	 enactment	 of	 the	 1993	 Constitution.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 implied	affirmation	of	constitutional	sovereignty	in	Carmichele	 is	at	best	a	surreptitious	or	obfuscated	affirmation	of	sovereignty.		
IV.	Self-defeating	Abdications	of	Sovereignty			 In	his	dissent	in	Du	Plessis,	Justice	Kriegler	believed	that	he	was	proposing	“direct	horizontal	effect”	jurisprudence	for	South	Africa	that	differed	significantly	from	 the	 “indirect	 horizontal	 effect”	 jurisprudence	 for	 which	 the	 majority	opted.66	This	was	not	really	the	case,	as	I	show	elsewhere,	but	let	us	nevertheless	look	at	one	of	the	crucial	statements	with	which	he	sought	to	 justify	his	“direct	horizontal”	approach.	This	“direct	horizontal	approach”,	he	argued,	“is	a	 far	cry	from	the	spectre	of	the	state	placing	its	hand	on	private	relationships.”67	Justice	Kriegler	 was	 evidently	 bothered	 by	 the	 implications	 of	 a	 strong	 avowal	 of	sovereignty	 that	 are	 evident	 in	 endorsements	 of	 “direct	 horizontal	 effect.”	 He	was,	as	Matthias	Kumm	puts	 it,	 “afraid	of	 the	 total	 constitution”	and	suspected	that	there	might	be	something	like	a	totalitarian	state	lurking	in	or	behind	it.	The	 perception	 that	 the	 strong	 avowal	 of	 sovereignty	 evident	 in	 the	endorsement	 of	 direct	 horizontal	 effect	 is	 irreconcilable	 with	 concerns	 with	liberty	 may	 well	 also	 be	 the	 source	 of	 the	 notorious	 conceptual	 difficulties	
                                                65	Cf.	VAN	DER	WALT,	HORIZONTAL	EFFECT	REVOLUTION,	supra	note	8.	66	Du	Plessis	v.	De	Klerk		1996	(5)	BCLR	658	(CC)	at	720	D–I	(Kriegler,	J.,	dissenting)	(S.	Afr).	67	 Id.	at	720	D–I.	 It	should	be	noted	again	here	that	 the	majority	 judgment	 in	Du	Plessis	did	not	literally	 present	 itself	 as	 a	 stance	 in	 favour	 of	 indirect	 horizontality,	 nor	 did	 Justice	 Kriegler	present	 his	 position	 as	 a	 stance	 in	 favour	 of	 direct	 horizontality.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 the	 former	simply	 rejected	 horizontal	 effect	 and	 the	 latter	 endorsed	 it.	 However,	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 both	opinions	shows	that	the	majority	had	indirect	horizontal	effect	in	mind	whereas	Justice	Kriegler	had	 a	 kind	 of	 direct	 horizontality	 in	mind—even	 though	 he	 too	 ended	 up	 proposing	 a	 kind	 of	indirect	horizontality	in	a	rather	self-contradictory	way.		
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associated	with	the	state	action	doctrine.	This	is	indeed	how	Louis	Seidman	sees	the	 matter	 in	 a	 most	 instructive	 1993	 article.68	 Seidman’s	 basic	 question	 is	whether	 Americans	 lawyers	 should	 not	 simply	 accept	 the	 Hohfeldian	 point	 to	straighten	out	 the	conceptual	problems	that	attach	to	 the	state	action	doctrine.	As	 he	 puts	 it:	 “Why	 not	 simply	 concede	 that	 state	 action	 is	 always	 present	 in	some	 form	 and	 move	 directly	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 whether	 the	 state	 action	 is	constitutionally	permissible?”69	And	he	responds	as	follows:		 In	 light	 of	 the	 confusion	 produced	 by	 the	 state	 action	 inquiry,	 this	approach	 is	 certainly	 attractive.	 Unfortunately,	 however,	 it	 only	 shifts	 the	problem	without	 really	 solving	 it,	 because	 something	 like	 the	 state	 action	doctrine—together	 with	 all	 the	 uncertainty	 and	 incoherence	 that	accompanies	it—is	built	into	how	we	think	about	constitutional	rights.70		 And	how	is	it	that	Americans	think	about	constitutional	rights,	according	to	Seidman?	They	think	of	it,	on	the	one	hand,	claims	Seidman,	in	terms	of	legitimate	sovereign	pursuits	of	ideals	of	social	justice—such	as	the	New	Deal	revolution—to	which	we	subscribe	unwaveringly.	But	they	also	want	“to	embrace,”	on	the	other	hand,	“a	concept	of	a	private	sphere	because	we	know	that	it	preserves	a	space	for	individual	flourishing	that	the	state	may	otherwise	destroy.”71	If	Seidman	is	right,	a	commitment	to	constitutional	rights	is	much	like	being	lethally	allergic	to	oxygen.	Constitutional	rights	depend	on	strong	sovereignty	and	are	fatally	threatened	by	strong	sovereignty.	This	would	surely	explain	the	conundrum	with	which	Justice	Kriegler’s	dissent	in	Du	Plessis	leaves	us.	If	state	action	and	horizontal	effect	jurisprudence	is	going	to	make	any	headway	out	of	this	conundrum,	it	will	have	to	come	forth	with	an	articulation	of	constitutional	rights	that	does	not	fatally	pitch	constitutional	sovereignty	and	constitutional	freedoms	against	one	another,	but	rather	understands	them	as	mutually	sustaining	one	another—that	is,	as	reinforcing	one	another.	This	is	where	horizontal	effect	and	state	action	theory	would	need	to	pick	up	the	debate	if	it	is	to	make	any	significant	progress.72			
                                                68	Louis	Michael	Seidman,	The	State	Action	Paradox,	10	CONST.	COMMENT.	379,	397	(1993).	69	Id.	at	392.	This	is	the	question	asked	by	all	the	authors	cited,	supra	note	8.	70	Seidman,	supra	note	68,	at	392-93.		71	Id.	at	401.	72	See	further	VAN	DER	WALT,	HORIZONTAL	EFFECT	REVOLUTION,	supra	note	8	(where	I	believe	I	have	taken	some	first	steps	in	this	regard).									
